CHALABÍ, MON AMI: Parece ser que el motivo de la caída en desgracia de Ahmad Chalabi es, nada menos, desvelar a los servicios secretos iraníes que su código de cifrado de las comunicaciones secretas había sido descifrado por los EEUU, que estaban interceptando y leyendo absolutamente todo:

Ahmad Chalabi, the Iraqi leader and former ally of the Bush administration, disclosed to an Iranian official that the United States had broken the secret communications code of Iran's intelligence service, betraying one of Washington's most valuable sources of information about Iran, according to United States intelligence officials.

The general charge that Mr. Chalabi provided Iran with critical American intelligence secrets was widely reported last month after the Bush administration cut off financial aid to Mr. Chalabi's organization, the Iraqi National Congress, and American and Iraqi security forces raided his Baghdad headquarters.

Menos mal que los espías iraníes no son precisamente unos jamesbonds:

American officials said that about six weeks ago, Mr. Chalabi told the Baghdad station chief of Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security that the United States was reading the communications traffic of the Iranian spy service, one of the most sophisticated in the Middle East.

According to American officials, the Iranian official in Baghdad, possibly not believing Mr. Chalabi's account, sent a cable to Tehran detailing his conversation with Mr. Chalabi, using the broken code. That encrypted cable, intercepted and read by the United States, tipped off American officials to the fact that Mr. Chalabi had betrayed the code-breaking operation, the American officials said.

American officials reported that in the cable to Tehran, the Iranian official recounted how Mr. Chalabi had said that one of "them" — a reference to an American — had revealed the code-breaking operation, the officials said. The Iranian reported that Mr. Chalabi said the American was drunk.

Pero esperad, que aún es peor:

The Iranians sent what American intelligence regarded as a test message, which mentioned a cache of weapons inside Iraq, believing that if the code had been broken, United States military forces would be quickly dispatched to the specified site. But there was no such action.

Lo que demuestra el nivel de estulticia de los servicios secretos iraníes, y la poquísima confianza que tenían en Chalabi, cuya reputación curiosamente se basaba en buena parte en sus 'canales abiertos' con los ayatolás. Porque si para avisarse entre ellos de que quizás les han 'roto' la clave usan precisamente esa misma clave, y encima la vuelven usar para ese mensaje-anzuelo, ¿no es razonable pensar que los americanos no iban a picar? Ese mensaje anzuelo sólo tendría sentido si el de aviso hubiese sido hecho con una clave diferente, o a través de un sistema de entrega distinto, por ejemplo en persona, algo factible teniendo en cuenta que cada día están entrando y saliendo cientos de personas a través de la frontera Irano-iraquí. Sólo así sería razonable pensar que se el anzuelo podía ser mordido.

Habrá que ver qué dice Hitchens de todo esto.