DESDE QUE ESTA MAÑANA he oído los informativos de la radio, sabía que iba a suceder: Charles Duelfer, a cargo del equipo de investigadores de las armas de destrucción masiva de Iraq, entregó un apéndice de su informe, y como era de esperar ha sido malintepretado (registro o Bugmenot):

Estados Unidos no ha encontrado prueba alguna de que el régimen de Saddam Hussein trasladara armas de destrucción masiva a Siria antes de la invasión estadounidense de Iraq de marzo del 2003. Esta conclusión se incorpora en el informe final presentado por los inspectores norteamericanos del Iraq Survey Group (ISG).

El documento definitivo sobre la infructuosa búsqueda de los supuestos arsenales iraquíes, la razón número uno esgrimida por la Administración Bush para justificar la guerra, se dio a conocer con reveladora discreción en Washington.

El motivo de darse a conocer sin aspavientos es, sencillamente, que el informe no dice lo que el corresponsal de La Vanguardia en Washington afirma. Ed Driscoll:

First, by its inclusion in the addenda and not the main body, it tells us ... nothing. The data remains inconclusive, and that's all. ISG could not go into Syria, nor into the Bekaa Valley that until this week was controlled by Syria, to determine if any kind of transfers took place. The only conclusion they could reach is that official transfers never took place, meaning that Saddam's files contained no records of any such movement of materiel between Iraq and Syria. The report further tells us that had the ISG had the time and resources to follow up on the leads provided, they still probably would find out nothing, given the geopolitical difficulties of invading Syria to complete the investigation.

Had Duelfer and the ISG meant to conclusively state that no WMD transfers of any kind had occurred, it would not have been left as a footnote or an addendum. That usage indicates an explanation for an unfulfilled mandate of the mission, not a positive conclusion, as a close read of the language used indicates.

The Washington Times article makes this more clear. In reading other parts of the same addenda, the ISG obviously did not intend to close the books on a Syrian transfer of WMD, and in fact still believe that such a scenario not only was possible, but somewhat likely.

Y es que en ese apéndice, Duelfer recomienda explícitamente que se siga investigando. Leed el resto.